REFORMING THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON
THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN:
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INTERSTATE ADOPTION

MADELYN D. FREUNDLICHt

INTRODUCTION

The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children ("ICPC"),
enacted in all fifty states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin
Islands, has come under mounting scrutiny from adoption practitioners
and policy makers. The ICPC, ostensibly designed to facilitate the
interstate placement of children while assuring the suitability of the
families with whom they are placed, increasingly is being viewed as
a hindrance rather than a facilitator of adoption, and as a bureaucratic
barrier rather than a tool to promote children's best interests. The
role of the ICPC in adoption has not been examined extensively in
legal or social work literature. While social work literature has
largely ignored it, legal literature has tended to analyze the Compact
1
and make recommendations to enhance its efficacy.
This article will examine the ICPC in relation to the role it has
played and could play in promoting permanency for children through
adoption. It will consider the purpose of the ICPC, and the statutory
language and implementation of the ICPC as it has actually occurred
in the states. Finally, it will make recommendations regarding the
regulation of interstate adoption, with an emphasis on timely and
dependable facilitation of adoption of children by families who are
able to provide them with the love and stability they need.

t
The author is an attorney with an area of concentration in child welfare
law and policy. She expresses her appreciation to Athena Brodsky, Cynthia Beatty
and Stephanie Gendell for their generous assistance.
1. See, e.g., Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children in Interstate Adoption, 6S NEB. L. Rrv. 292 (19S9).
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I. WHY THE ICPC?
The ICPC is a compact2 that focuses on child welfare -- both
foster care and adoption. Enactment of the ICPC was prompted by
concerns over the inadequacy of safeguards that would ensure that
children placed with foster and adoptive families across state lines
receive protection, appropriate care and supervision. States were
aware of their inability to exercise jurisdiction over children placed
outside their geographical boundaries and, as a result, they found that
they could neither determine the appropriateness of placements nor
ensure that children placed in other states receive needed services and
supervision in their new foster or adoptive homes. Drafted in 1960
and enacted initially by New York that year, all states, the District of
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have now adopted the [CPC.3 In
essence, the ICPC mandates that certain procedural requirements be
followed by a "sending agency" to obtain the permission of a
"receiving state" prior to the interstate placement of a child for
purposes of foster care or adoption. The system, as designed, is one
of prospective compliance to ensure appropriate interstate placements.
Article I of the ICPC sets forth as the purpose and policy of the
ICPC the cooperation of states with each other in the interstate
placement of children. To that end, the Compact outlines four key
objectives: determination of the suitability of the interstate placement;
determination of any circumstances bearing on the protection of the
2.
A compact is "lain agreement or contract between persons, nations or
states. Commonly applied to working agreements between and among states
concerning matters of mutual concern." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (6th ed.

1990).
3.
The genesis of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children can
be traced to an informal group of social service administrators on the East Coast who
met in the 1950s to study problems in the interstate placement of children in foster
care. Subsequently, the ICPC was drafted under the auspices of the New York State
Legislative Committee on Interstate Cooperation. A 12 state conference approved
the Compact in 1960. Following New York's lead, other states enacted the Compact

over the ensuing decades. See Hartfield, supra note 1, at 295; THE SECRETARIAT
TO THE ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE

PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN,
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN

GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE

3 (1990) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE

COMPACT].
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child; obtaining of complete information on which to "evaluate a
projected placement before it is made"; and promoting "appropriate
jurisdictional arrangements for the care of the children placed.",4 The
first three objectives address the approval process that is considered
critical to ensuring the safety and well being of a child placed in
another state. The fourth objective addresses the promotion of
appropriate jurisdictional arrangements.
Underlying the stated purpose and policy of the ICPC is a
recognition that certain custody matters regarding children must be
addressed at an interstate level because they cannot be regulated
adequately by a single state's law. There is an implicit recognition
that, absent some level of interstate agreement, one state can avoid its
responsibility for abused and neglected children within its jurisdiction
by encouraging caregiving arrangements in another state. Without an
agreement that spells out roles and responsibilities, a state could avoid
its legal and financial responsibility for these children and potentially
create a financial burden for another state. The ICPC is therefore
designed both to promote interstate cooperation around these custody
arrangements and to prevent the potential financial exploitation of one
state by another.'
In view of the underlying rationale of the Compact, its stated
purpose and policy, and, as will be discussed below, its substantive
provisions and actual implementation, serious questions arise as to
whether the ICPC is a regulatory system suitable for all forms of
interstate adoption. Even in those cases in which the ICPC is
appropriate, there are equally troublesome issues about the extent to
which true interstate cooperation has been realized.

4.
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEIENT OF CHILDREN art. I (Am.
Pub. Welfare Ass'n) [hereinafter ICPC].
5.
Some proponents of the ICPC state this goal more starkly. See, e.g.,
Mitchell Wendell & Betsey R. Rosenbaum, Interstate Adoptions: The Interstate
Compact on the Placementof Childrei, in ADOPTION LANW AND PRACTICE Appendix

3-A at 3A-4 (Joan H. Hollinger ed. 1995) (writing that one of the purposes of the
ICPC is "ltlo reduce the possibility of children without suitable persons or
institutions to receive them being dumped into other states').
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THE PROPER SCOPE OF THE ICPC

As with most statutory frameworks, the ICPC begins with
definitions of some of its key terms -- "child," "sending agency,"

"receiving state," and "placement"6 -- definitions that should provide
clarity about the scope of the Compact. In the context of adoption,
however, these definitions have created confusion and led to
significant dispute over the extent of the Compact's reach. Equally
at issue is the appropriateness of applying these definitions to the three
major types of interstate adoption -- public-agency directed adoptions
of children in the custody of a governmental agency at the state or
county level, licensed private agency-assisted adoptions of children not
in state or county custody, and adoptive placements of children by
their parent(s). Although the definitions of "child"7 and "receiving
state"' are relatively clear and undisputed, the two remaining
definitions set forth in Article II of the ICPC -- "sending agency" and
"placement" -- when applied to interstate adoption, are at best
problematic, and at worst detrimental to the best interests of children.
A. The Definition of "Sending Agency"
Perhaps most troublesome is the ICPC's use and definition of the
term "sending agency." Although the overall scheme of the Compact
refers to a "receiving state," it does not utilize the concept of a
"sending state." Instead, the ICPC refers to a "sending agency" which
it defines as "a party state, officer, or employee thereof; a subdivision
of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party
state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency or other
entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child
to another party state.

"'

6.
See ICPC, supra note 4, art. II.
7.
A "child" Is defined as, "a person who, by reason of minority, is legally
subject to parental, guardianship or similar control." Id.

8. A "receiving state" is defined as, "the state to which a child is sent,
brought, or caused to be sent or brought, whether by public authorities or private
persons or agencies, and whether for placement with state or local public authorities
or for placement with private agencies or persons." Id. art. II(c).
9.

Id. art. 11(b).
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This extremely broad definition includes virtually any individual
or entity that plays any role in "sending" or "causing to be sent" a
child into another state, potentially reaching multiple parties in any
one interstate placement. The breadth of the "sending agency"
definition is particularly important because it subjects a broad range
of individuals and entities to additional mandates of the ICPC: the
burden of compliance is put on the "sending agency," with penalties
for non-compliance, and the ICPC requires that the "sending agency"
retain jurisdiction over the child who is placed until the adoption is
finalized. 10
"Sending agency," as a structural concept in the ICPC, has
minimal impact in the context of foster care because the possible
"sending agencies" are clearly identifiable and generally limited in
number. In virtually every instance, interstate foster care placements
involve children who are in the custody of a state or county child
welfare agency and/or family or juvenile court. The "sending agency"
is a governmental entity with legal and financial responsibility for
children and the activities are clearly within the purpose of the ICPC.
In nearly every case, the "sending agency" is actually a "sending
state."
In the context of adoption, however, the term "sending agency"
impacts a broad range of circumstances that constitute interstate
adoption, whether or not a state has custody of the child. ICPC
regulation is appropriate in cases of adoptive placements by a state or
county child welfare agency and/or court of jurisdiction involving
children in foster care who are placed with adoptive families in
another state. While problematic from other standpoints, as discussed
below, the ICPC is a sound regulatory response designed to enhance
interstate cooperation and avert interstate exploitation."' Such is not

10. See id. art. V.
11. See, e.g., Nevmanv. Worcester County Dep't. of Soc. Serv., 659 N.E.2d
593 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) in which the ICPC provided a mechanism for cooperative
efforts between Maryland and Indiana. In this case, the pre-adoptive parents, nith
whom three siblings were placed, requested the removal of two of the siblings from
their home - which was done - but then refused to obtain a psychological evaluation
as part of the home study for the adoption of the third sibling. Both states concurred
that the child should not remain in the home. Maryland, the sending state, obtained

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1997

HYBRID

[Vol. 4:15

the case, however, for direct adoptive placements by parents who are
initiating placements on their own or with the help of an intermediary
such as an attorney or physician, or for adoptions assisted by licensed
private agencies that involve children who are not in publicly
supported foster care.
1. Direct Adoptive Placements and the
"Sending Agency" Definition
The ICPC generally considers a parent to be a "sending agency"
when she places her child, often a newborn, for adoption across state
lines. Parents are required to conform to the ICPC provisions in the
same manner as a governmental state or county child welfare agency
or court seeking to adoptively place a child in foster care. Such a
broad application of the ICPC produces some bewildering results.
Leading proponents of the ICPC,"2 for example, argue that the
following scenarios are subject to the ICPC:
A pregnant woman leaves State A for the purpose of
placing baby with an agency in State B. The baby is born
in State B and relinquished to the agency. The mother

returns to State A.
A pregnant woman in State A delivers her child in State
B and relinquishes the child to prospective adoptive

parents living in State B. The mother returns to State A.
Prospective adoptive parents from State B enter State A

for the purpose of taking custody of a child that has been
born and relinquished in State A. The adoptive parents
then return to State B with the child. 3

a court order mandating the return of the child, and Indiana enforced the order.
When the pre-adoptive parents attempted to have the order dismissed, the Indiana
court utilized the ICPC as the basis for Maryland's authority to require rle return of
die child.
12. See generally Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note 5.
13. Id. at 3A-11 to 3A-12.
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In none of these instances is there an issue regarding interstate
cooperation, potential interstate exploitation, or jurisdictional
authority. In each instance, the receiving state [State BI would have
in place adoption and licensing laws that address the determination of
the suitability of the adoptive family.14 There is no need to impose
additional ICPC mandatesis and, given the extraordinary time delays
and other implementation problems of the ICPC, discussed below, it
is likely to be against children's best interests to do so.
2. Adoptions Assisted by Licensed PrivateAgencies
and the "Sending Agency" Definition
The same issues related to the inadequate fit with the Compact's

14. Questions may arise about the extent to which any one state's law
sufficiently protects children and appropriately regulates adoption. There is
considerable variation in states' adoption laws with widely varying approaches to
relinquishment and consent, to the legality of independent adoption without agency
involvement, and to the practice of adoption by for-profit agencies. Some
proponents of the ICPC have argued that ICPC oversight is necessary in the case of
states they view as having deficiencies in their adoption laws. Although it may be
a correct observation that some states' laws provide minimal, or possibly inadequate
protections, those laws nevertheless bind intrastate adoptions in those states and
adoption decrees issued by any such state are entitled to full faith and credit in other
states. See William M. Schur, Adoption Proccdure, in ADormori Lw AND
PRACTICE §4.02[61 at 4-47 to 4-51 (Joan H. Hollinger ed. 1995).
The issue is whether the ICPC, as a vehicle for promoting interstate
coordination as stated in Article I, should be used to subject those states deemed
deficient by those who administer the ICPC to procedures and standards that vary
from those states' laws. Arguably, efforts to advance the quality of adoption lav
should take the form of a uniform adoption act or model adoption legislation, and not
direction from a non-legislative, non-judicial entity such as the ICPC administrative
structure.
15. There are valid concerns about interstate "baby brokering," that is,
unethical practices that, in effect, provide infants in exchange for substantial sums
of money. Some have argued that the ICPC functions to prevent such practices.
There is, however, little indication that the ICPC, as substantively structured and as
implemented, can or does play such a role. The extent and nature of "baby
brokering" practices should be carefully assessed, the need for more effective
monitoring and enforcement determined, and the most appropriate mechanisms to
respond to this issue created or enhanced.
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purpose also arise when the definition of "sending agency" is applied
to licensed private agencies. These agencies assist both the sending
and receiving states with the adoption of children who are not in the
custody of a governmental entity. As it does with adoptive placements
by birth parents, the ICPC layers a complex regulatory scheme on a
process for which there is no possibility of state-to-state misconduct.
The Compact inappropriately extends interstate adoption regulation to
a matter that is adequately addressed by the law of a single state
through the substantive state law governing adoption and licensing law
that regulates agency practice.
3. Further Confusion As a Result of Attempts to
Exempt Certain Adoptions
The ICPC includes virtually any person and entity within the
definition of "sending agency;" it is inappropriately broad in scope,
though very clear in meaning. And, the ICPC complicates matters by
attempting to exempt from its reach some adoptive placements initiated
by parents, certain relatives and guardians. Article VIII of the ICPC
provides that "[t]his compact shall not apply to: (a) The sending or
bringing of a child into a receiving state by his parent, step-parent,
grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his
guardian and leaving the child with any such relative or non-agency
guardian in the receiving state. "16

Apparently intended to limit its own reach in those cases in which
the ICPC should not intervene, Article VIII has created uncertainty
about which placements by parties ordinarily considered "sending
agencies" are subject to the Compact. In practice, the exemption has
tended to create distinctions that not only are difficult to comprehend
but that complicate any attempt to predict ICPC applicability in future
cases.

The impact of the Article VIII exemption can be seena in direct
placements by parents and in adoptions assisted by licensed private
agencies. Effectively, ICPC approval is not needed by a parent in
State A who sends a child into State B to be adopted by an adult
relative who has not had any prior contact with the child or, in the
16.

ICPC, supra note 4, art. VIII(a).
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worst case scenario, has maltreated the child. A parent from State A,
however, who delivers her baby in State B and relinquishes the child
for adoption to a couple in State B who have been approved by i
licensed private adoption agency in that state must comply with the
Compact. The distinction is apparently based on the ICPC's view that
the biological connection in the specified relationships is significant
enough, standing alone, to bypass the ICPC protections believed
necessary in virtually every other interstate adoption. Ironically, the
presumption of appropriateness because of the biological relationship
exists only in the context of the receiving relative. The birth parent
-- who has the most significant biological relationship with the child
-- is, on her or his own, accorded no such presumption of fitness in
decision making.
The Article VIII exemption is particularly problematic in its
references to actions by "guardians." Because "guardian" is not
defined in the Compact, it is unclear who or what qualifies as a
guardian for ICPC purposes. Notwithstanding this oversight, Article
VIII states that ICPC approval is not needed when the sending party
is a guardian and the child is sent either to a relative specified in
Article VIII or to a "non-agency guardian." Assuming that a sending
state's law or policy would permit an agency to act as guardian, the
guardian agency could avoid compliance with the ICPC by sending the
child to a relative or to another person who simultaneously is serving
as the child's guardian.
Recognizing the particular lack of clarity in connection with the
references to "guardian" in Article VIII, the Association of
Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children
["the Association"] and the American Public Welfare Association,
acting as the Association's Secretariat, 7 issued Regulation III to
outline those aspects of parenting or guardianship that must be met to
avoid compliance with the ICPC. Regulation III states:
17.

The responsibilities of the Secretariat include coordinating ICPC aetivitles

at the national level, record keeping, compiling and disseminating data, maintaining
the Compact Administrators' Manual, and providing teclnical assistance.
Additionally, the Secretariat provides advisory opinions to compact administrators
which are then included in the Compact Administrators' Manual. Hartfield, supra
note 1, at 301.
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Article VIII(a) of this Compact applies only to the sending
or bringing of a child into a receiving state to a parent or
other specified individual by a parent or other specified
individual whose full legal right to plan for the child has
been established by law at a time prior to initiation of the
placement arrangement, and has not been voluntarily
terminated or diminished or severed by the action or order
of any Court."8
Regulation III has confused rather than clarified the interpretation of
the ICPC. One court, for example, concluded that the same standard
that applies to a sending guardian -- that is, the full legal right to plan
for a child, established prior to the initiation of the placement -- must
also apply to a non-agency guardian who receives a child.19 This
interpretation requires equivalent legal rights to plan for the child on
the part of two parties in two different states. The fact that at least
one court has given Regulation III such a narrow construction suggests
that any purported exception to ICPC applicability may have little
relevance in actual practice. Even after the exemption attempt in
Article VIII and the clarification attempt in Regulation III, the ICPC
is likely to be held to apply to all interstate adoption cases, with much
added confusion and uncertainty.
4. The Courts and the Interpretationsof "Sending Agency"
Courts have evidenced the same confusion as practitioners
concerning the reach of the ICPC. For example, several courts have
held that the ICPC does not apply to adoptive placements by birth
parents. 2" Other courts have insisted that because the definition of
"sending agency" includes "person," the ICPC must apply to birth

18.
AMERICAN PUBLIC WELFARE ASSOCIATION, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT
ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL at 1.23

(Regulation II1(c)) (1982) [hereinafter COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL].
19. See, e.g., In the Matter of Adoption of Baby "E", 427 N.Y.S.2d 705, 709
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980) (concluding that "a non-agency guardian wlio receives the
child must meet the same standards as the one who places the child . . ").
20. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy W, 701 S.W.2d 534, 542 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 981 (Wyo. 1982).
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parents. 21 If courts are unable to reach consensus regarding the
scope of the ICPC, those attempting to comply with the Compact face
ongoing uncertainty. The safer route has been to assume that all cases
of interstate adoption are within the Compact's reach - a result that
has proven to be less than optimal for the children affected by it.
Some of the more troubling outcomes are associated with holdings
that birth parents are "sending agencies" within the meaning of the
ICPC. In Stancil v. Brock,22 for example, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals relied upon the "sending agency" definition - which it
interpreted to include birth parents -- and broadened the right of birth
parents to revoke consent to the adoption of their child.' In this
case, birth parents in Kentucky agreed to place their child for adoption
with a couple in North Carolina. The birth parents initiated an ICPC
request through the Kentucky office and executed a consent to
adoption that conformed with the laws of the receiving state, North
Carolina. The prospective adoptive parents traveled to Kentucky when
the child was born, took physical custody of the child, returned to
North Carolina and filed a petition for adoption in North Carolina.
Subsequently, the birth parents filed with the North Carolina court
petitions to revoke their consent to adoption and to dismiss the
2 4adoptive parents' petition to adopt.
The North Carolina court ruled that the birth parents were a
"sending agency" and in an interpretation inconsistent even with that
of the Association, held that the birth parents retained jurisdiction over
the child until the adoption was finalized. ' Having such jurisdiction,

21. See, e.g., Broyles v. Ashworth, 782 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App. 1989);
Cornhusker Christian Children's Home v. Department of Soc. Serv., 429 N.W.2d
359, 362 (Neb. 1988).
22. 425 S.E.2d 446, 450 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
23. Id. at 450.
24. Id. at 447-48.
25. Id. at 450. The court focused on the jurisdictional provisions of the ICPC
which refer to the ongoing financial responsibility of the "sending agency' for the
child until the adoption in the receiving state is finalized. The Association does not
consider birth parents to be "sending agencies" in the jurisdictional [i.e., financial
obligation] sense. Unlike other sending agencies, birth parents do not have
responsibility for the financial support of the child pending finalization of the
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the birth parents were empowered to demand return of the child to
Kentucky. By relying on the jurisdictional provisions of the ICPC, the
court permitted the birth parents to subvert state adoption law. This
result undermines the stated purpose of the ICPC -- to promote

interstate cooperation in adoption. Furthermore, the ruling highlights
the problem of using the ICPC to disrupt approved adoptive
placements, which in turn disrupt the stability and security to which
children are entitled.
B. The Definition of "Placement"
"Placement" means, for purposes of the ICPC:
the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or
boarding home or in a child-caring agency or institution
but does not include any institution caring for the mentally
ill, mentally defective or epileptic or any institution

primarily educational 26in character, and any hospital or
other medical facility.
Terms within the definition such as "family free" and "boarding
home" are not defined in the Compact. "Family free" apparently
refers to a family home in which there is no charge for the child's
care and the child is provided with "the care which children usually
receive from their parents as part of the process of upbringing, "27
and "boarding home" is apparently one in which there is a charge for
the child's care. Both terms refer to foster care. In fact, the
definition of "placement" contains no reference to adoption, suggesting
that the ICPC was drafted more out of concern for interstate foster
care arrangements than adoption.
The omission of a reference to adoption in the definition section
of the ICPC understandably led a number of courts in the 1980s to
question whether the ICPC had any application to pre-adoptive
placements.2" The issue ultimately was resolved in the affirmative
through a reading of the definition of "placement" with the language
adoption. See Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note 5, at 3A-10 to 3A-I 1.
26. ICPC, supra note 4, art. II(d).
27. COMPACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 18, at 2.2 (Compact
Provisions, An Interpretative Commentary); Hartfield, supra note 1, at 298.
28. See Hartfield, supra note 1, at 313.
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of Article III of the Compact which requires ICPC approval for
"placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible
adoption."29 The Article III language is of particular interest because
it suggests an intent to regulate activities that could lead to adoption
rather than those activities clearly intended as permanent (not
preliminary) steps to ensure an actual (not possible) adoption.
As with other aspects of the ICPC, the ambiguity of the definition
has led to confusion and to attempts to include virtually any interstate
activity within the scope of the Compact. And, as with the definition
Of "sending agency," the appropriateness of extending the reach of the
ICPC to adoptive "placements" by birth parents has been an issue.
One court held that a private adoption initiated by birth parents is a
"positive, not potential act" and, therefore, not within the scope of the
ICPC's definition of placement as "a preliminary to a possible
adoption.""
This interpretation, although a more reasoned
construction of the ICPC, is in the minority. Most courts" and the
Association32 have determined -- consistent with what appears to be
the prevailing approach of giving the broadest possible interpretation
to the scope of the Compact - that "placement" includes direct
adoptive placements by parents across state lines.
The Association has expanded even further the reach of the ICPC
by defining "placement" as including those situations in which a family
moves from one state to another after the adoptive placement has
occurred but before finalization of the adoption. 3 This interpretation
transforms what starts as an intrastate adoption into an interstate
"placement" (despite the fact that the child has already been "placed")
subject to the provisions of the ICPC. The inclusion of these

29.

ICPC, supra note 4, art. I(b) (emplsis added).

30. In re Adoption of MM, 652 P.2d 974, 981 (Wyo. 1982).
31. See, e.g., Inre Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So.2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 675 A.2d 170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996), cert. granted, 678 A.2d 1047 (Md. 1996); In re Baby Girl, 850 S.W.2d 64
(Mo. 1993); In re Adoption of Baby "E", 427 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 19S0).
32. See Hartfield, supra note 1, at 314; COMPAcr" ADMINISTRATOiRS'
MANUAL, supra note 18, at 2.36 (Opinions of Interest).
33. COrPAcT ADNiIsTRArORs' MANUAL, supra note 18, at 1.20 (Regulation
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adoptions within the scope of the Compact becomes understandable
only from the perspective that there is an overriding interest in
extending ICPC application to the largest possible pool of adoptions.
C. Summary and Recommendations
The broad scope of the ICPC as suggested by the definitions of
"sending agency" and "placement" undermines the purpose of the
Compact. Moreover, this broad scope does not promote the best
interests of children placed for adoption across state lines. There is
no legitimate policy or practice rationale for extending the reach of the
ICPC to adoptive placements by birth parents or to adoptions assisted
by licensed private agencies that involve children who are not in the
custody of a state or county governmental entity. The application of
the ICPC to these adoptions -- without adding any protections or
benefits for children -- creates additional bureaucratic, demands,
prolonged time delays in authorizing the placement, confusion, and,
in many instances, extremely poor outcomes for children.
The ICPC should be limited to interstate adoptive placements by
public authorities of children who are the legal and/or financial
responsibility of a governmental entity. To achieve that end, the
concept of "sending agency" should be eliminated from the Compact
and a new concept of "sending state" substituted. "Sending state"
should be defined as a governmental entity that has legal and/or
financial responsibility for children subject to the interstate placement.
Through a modification of the current definition of "sending agency,"
"sending state" could be defined as "a party state, officer, or employee
thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof;
a court of a party state; any of which sends, brings, or causes to be
sent or brought any child to another party state." Corresponding
changes in the definition of "receiving state" should delete all
references to placement by "private persons" and "private
agencies. "'

34. "Receiving state" would be defined as "the state to which a child is sent,
brought, or caused to be sent or brought by public authorities and for placement with
state or local public authorities." Compare current definition of "receiving state,"
supra note 8.
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Similarly, "placement" should be redefined to incorporate "the
arrangement for adoption of a child" and the ambiguous language in
Article III, "a preliminary to a possible adoption," 3 5 should be
eliminated entirely. That change would clarify that the ICPC applies
to interstate adoption, and when read with the definition of "sending
state," would provide practitioners and courts alike with an
understanding of the public agency nature of the adoptions being
regulated.
This approach would focus on the effective and efficient
implementation of the Compact to serve the best interests of children
who are in publicly supported foster care - children for whom
adoption is the pathway to permanent families who will provide them
with the love, stability and security to which they are entitled. As the
following section outlines, the ICPC, as currently construed and
administered, largely has failed to provide these children with the
permanency which they need and deserve. As is the case with the
scope of the ICPC, the substantive provisions of the ICPC and its
implementation require significant changes to better serve children in
the public child welfare system.
III. THE ICPC AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
IN THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM

The goal for children for whom public child welfare agencies
have legal and financial responsibility should be permanency with
families who can provide security, stability, love and nurture and who
understand and can respond effectively to the special needs that many
of these children have. To meet this goal, the ICPC should have in
place an approval process that evaluates the prospective adoptive
family and any circumstances that could affect the protection of the
child. Further, an assessment of the appropriateness of the projected
placement should be provided to the sending state26
As with other aspects of the ICPC, the approval process has
hindered the achievement of these aims. Article III prohibits any
interstate foster care or adoptive placement on the part of any sending
35.

ICPC, supra note 4, art. III(a).

36.

Id. art. I.
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agency "unless the sending agency shall comply with each and every
requirement set forth in this article and with the applicable laws of the
37
receiving state governing the placement of children therein."
Problems arise in four areas: (1) inadequate attention to the
requirements that the receiving state must meet in determining and
issuing approval for interstate adoptive placements; (2) confusion
regarding compliance with state law in addition to ICPC requirements;
(3) jurisdictional uncertainty; and (4) untimely and unresponsive
implementation of the approval process.
A. Inadequate Attention to Receiving State Mandates
The ICPC clearly mandates that the sending agency notify the
receiving state of a potential interstate placement. Such notice must
be in writing, it must be directed to "the appropriate public
authorities" in the receiving state; and it must contain biographical
data, a full statement of the reasons for the proposed placement, and
"evidence of the authority pursuant to which the placement is proposed
to be made. "38 The receiving state may request additional or
supporting information that it considers necessary "to carry out the
purpose and policy" of the ICPC.3 9
By contrast, the Compact mandates very little concerning the
approval process that the receiving state must utilize, despite the
explicit objectives regarding interstate placement approvals outlined in
Article I. The only stated requirement is that the approval be "in
writing."4° Perhaps most striking and unsettling, the ICPC does not
require that the proposed placement be in the child's best interests.
Rather, the ICPC merely provides that the receiving state's
communication to the sending agency be "to the effect that the
proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of
the child." 4 '
The lack of specificity regarding the approval process suggests a

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Id.

III(a).
111(d).
III(c).
111(d).
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surprising inattention to the explicit core function of the ICPC. The
purpose of the Compact is, as stated in Article I, to assure that
children "receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable
environment and with persons or institutions having appropriate
qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree
and type of care." 4"

The ICPC, however, in its substantive

provisions, fails to set even minimal standards for the assessment of
suitability, appropriateness, and desirability of care. The outcomes for
children have been at best troubling, and at worst dire.
An example of a particularly poor outcome as a result of this
inattention is seen in In re Paula G.43 In this case, the public child

welfare agency in Rhode Island learned that a child in state legal
custody had been moved by her mother to Florida and was living with
her mother's boyfriend. Rhode Island initiated an ICPC request with
the Florida authorities, and the Florida office, upon finding that the
boyfriend's home was inadequate and inappropriate, denied approval
for the child's ongoing placement in the state. Because approval
would not be granted, Florida would assume no responsibility for the
child's safety and welfare. A Rhode Island Family Court justice then
ordered that the child be placed temporarily in the home of the
boyfriend that the Florida authorities had found to be an inadequate
caregiver. The Rhode Island child welfare agency continued to object
to the placement, but the child nonetheless remained in Florida until
the boyfriend's home was severely damaged and became
uninhabitable. At this point, the child was returned to Rhode Island
where she entered a group home. 44
The case illustrates a number of issues related to the ICPC that
suggest that the best interests of children are not the focal point for the
ICPC decision-making process. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in
its review of the circumstances of this case, focused on the
impropriety of the Rhode Island Family Court justice's entry of an
order for a placement that did not have Florida's approval. The rules
42. Id. art. I(a).
43. 672 A.2d 872 (R.I. 1996). This is a case that does not Involve an interstate
adoptive placement but which nevertheless illustrates the realities of the approval
process in the context of a child's best interests.
44. Id. at 872-73.
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created by the ICPC were found to be violated by the action of the
Family Court justice, but no violation was noted with regard to the
decision by the Florida authorities to do nothing when the child's
placement in that state was found to be inappropriate.4 Nor was
there censure for the inaction that continued until a disaster destroyed
the home and required that the public authorities intervene.
Considerations other than the best interests of the child clearly drove
the decision making process.
A key change needed in the ICPC is the addition of an explicit
"best interest" standard. This would ensure that, in the case of each
child for whom an interstate adoption is sought, the Article I
objectives are met: determination of the qualifications and suitability
of prospective adoptive parents; assessment of the circumstances, with
particular attention to the protection of the child; and obtaining
complete information on which to evaluate the projected placement. 6
Minimal standards for the approval process should be incorporated
into the Compact, and concerns about violations of the ICPC -traditionally focused on the improper "sending" of children into
another state -- should be directed to the failure of states to provide
quality services as part of the approval process. Receiving ;tates must
be held accountable for outcomes, both in terms of the substantive
quality of the work being done on behalf of children and in terms of
the timeliness of their response.
B. Confusion Regarding Compliance With State Law
Adding to the difficulties associated with the ICPC application in
relation to interstate adoptions of children in foster care is the
confusion regarding the relationship between the ICPC and state law
governing the adoption of children. The ICPC states that compliance
is required with the laws of the receiving state only 47 while the

45. Id. at 874.
46. See ICPC, supra note 4, art. I(a)-(c). Implicit in this standard but outside
the scope of the ICPC would be the expectation that the public authorities, based on
their state-mandated child protection responsibilities, would intervene upon
discovering that a child is in an inadequate, inappropriate and/or dangerous situation.
47. See id. art. III(a).
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position of the Secretariat of the ICPC is that there must be
compliance with the laws of the receiving state and the sending
state. 4
Article III requires that the sending agency comply "with each
and every requirement" of the ICPC and "with the applicable laws of
4
the receiving state governing the placement of children therein." 1
This mandated compliance with the laws of the receiving state
recognizes that each state's law contains procedures designed to ensure
that prospective adoptive families provide desirable homes for
children. The mandate, however, fails to take into account the fact
that certain aspects of adoption law -- particularly in the areas of
voluntary relinquishment and consent to adoption and/or involuntary
termination of parental rights - may be more appropriately addressed
by the laws of the sending state where the birth parent resides at the
time the decision is made to free the child for adoption.
The Secretariat of the ICPC has addressed this issue by taking the
position that the ICPC, irrespective of its explicit language, requires
compliance with the laws of the sending state and the laws of the
receiving state."0 This position imposes two sets of laws - which
may or may not be the same or complementary -- on each interstate
adoptive placement, further complicating an already cumbersome
process. Some courts have questioned the validity of the Secretariat's
position and have held, consistent with the express language of the
Compact, that compliance must be only with the laws of the receiving
51
state.
The complexity of imposing compliance with the laws of both the
sending and receiving states -- and the poor outcomes that can result
from such a requirement -- are well illustrated by In Re Adoption No.

48. COMPACT ADMINISTRAToRs' MANUAL, supra note 18, at 2.2-2.3
(Compact Provisions, An Interpretive Commentary), 3.67 (Secretariat Opinion 37
(April 7, 1977)).
49. ICPC, supra note 4, art. I(a).
50. CONPACTADhiNISTRATORS' MANUAL, supra note 18, at2.2-2.3 (Compact
Provisions, An Interpretive Commentary), 3.67 (Secretariat Opinion 37 (April 7,
1977)).
51.

See, e.g., In the Matter of the Male Child bor July 15, 1985 to L.C., 718

P.2d 660 (Mont. 1986). See also Hartfield, supra note 1, at 317.
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1008Z2 In this case, the Maryland appellate court considered an
adoption made directly by a mother in Virginia to a family in
Maryland. The prospective adoptive parents had notified the Virginia
and Maryland ICPC offices of the impending adoption but Virginia -the sending state -- refused to give approval because the adoptive

parents declined to provide information required by Virginia. The
required form was to be completed by the biological mother and to
contain the names and addresses of the adoptive parents. Both the
biological parent and the adoptive parents, however, already had
agreed not to disclose their identities to one another. Although
Maryland had all necessary paperwork -- that is, all the requirements
of the receiving state were met -- it nevertheless refused to act until it
received a notice of approval from Virginia. The adoptive parents
transported the newborn to Maryland, knowing that they did not have
ICPC approval, and the next day notified both states that they had
custody of the baby."3 When the adoptive parents filed their adoption
petition in a Maryland court, the court dismissed the petition solely on
the basis of failure to comply with the ICPC. After a Court of Special
Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the petition, the adoptive family
appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals. At that juncture -- two
years after the adoptive family assumed custody of the child -- the

court reversed the dismissal of the petition. 4
Particularly noteworthy was the court's recognition tat despite
the underlying objectives of the Compact, neither ICPC office had
contacted the adoptive family during the two year period to assess the
child's placement.55 Given the fact that the Maryland ICPC office
was aware of the child's presence in its jurisdiction without ICPC
approval, the court stated that "[tihe best interest of the child dictates
that noncompliance with the ICPC in transporting a child into the state
should be carefully investigated at the earliest opportunity, not
ignored. ,,51 What the court did not state, but what is evident in the

52.

597 A.2d 456 (Md. 1991).

53.

Id. at 459-60.

54.

Id. at 460.

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 464.
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case, is that the bureaucratic insistence on compliance with the
requirements of both the sending and receiving states overrode other
important considerations in the case - including any concerns about
the well being of the child. Although this case involved a direct
placement by a birth parent, its lessons apply even more significantly
to interstate adoptive placements of children in foster care -- children
whose histories include abuse and neglect and whose safety and well
being with new adoptive families should be of paramount importance.
There are obvious difficulties when a legislative act -- the ICPC
-- explicitly states one rule of law and a non-judicial entity -- the

Association, acting through its Secretariat - construes that act in an
entirely different manner.57 If the ICPC were reconceptualized to
apply only to the interstate adoptive placements of children in publicly
supported foster care, the law of the sending state should control on
issues related to birth parent rights, and the law of the receiving state
should control on all other adoption related issues. If, for example,
the child is legally free for adoption as a result of voluntary
relinquishment or involuntary termination of parental rights, the law
of the sending state should determine the validity of the
relinquishment. The law of the receiving state should govern the
procedures regarding the assessment of the adoptive family and the
finalization of the adoption. In those rare cases in which the rights of
only one parent have been terminated either voluntarily or
involuntarily, the sending state should retain the responsibility to apply
its own laws to terminate the rights of the remaining parent."3 Such
an approach would obviate the need to apply potentially conflicting
state laws on the same matter and presumably expedite the adoption
process. As observed by one commentator, it is not in children's best

57. Secretariat Opinions do not have the force of law, but courts often cite
them as persuasive authority on issues related to the ICPC. Hartfield, supra note 1,
at 301.
58. It seems preferable that the rights of both parents be legally resolved prior
to the interstate adoptive placement. When the rights of both the birth mother and
birth father have been voluntarily relinquished or involuntarily terminated, the
placement is at less legal risk. Additionally, the sending state is likely to accord the
matter a greater sense of urgency if the status of both birth parents' rights must be
resolved prior to placement.
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interests to "insist that the laws of both the sending and receiving state
be followed in every detail. Without some flexibility in choosing the
appropriate rule of law for different aspects of an adoption proceeding,
the purported commitment of the ICPC to protecting the welfare of
children threatens to become a nullity."59

C. JurisdictionalUncertainty
Article I of the ICPC states that one of the key objectives of the
Compact is that "appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care
of children will be promoted."I Article V sets forth the rules for
"retention of jurisdiction."6" It states that the "sending agency"
retains jurisdiction as to "all matters in relation to the custody,
supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child as it would
have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state until
the child is adopted ...."62 The sending agency also has the power
to mandate the return of the child or the transfer of the child to
another location.63 Importantly, the sending agency continues to
"have financial responsibility for the support and maintenance of the
child during the period of the placement." I It is important to note
that Article V discusses jurisdiction in a manner that does not comply
with the usual understanding of jurisdiction in the legal sense -- that
is, "jurisdiction" as the authority by which courts and judicial officers
take and decide cases.6 5

A "sending agency," as d~fined in the

ICPC, cannot have jurisdiction in the traditional sense over any
matter; however, it can, and under the ICPC does, have specified

59. Joan H. Hollinger, Interstate Adoptions: The Interstate Cotapact on the
Placement of Children, in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE, Appendix 3-A at 3A- 1

(Joan Hollinger ed., Supp. 1995) [hereinafter InterstateAdoptions].
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

ICPC, supra note 4, art. I(d).
Id.art. V.
Id. art. V(a).
Id.
Id.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 853 (6th ed. 1990).
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responsibilities for a child who is placed in another state." From
this perspective, there are two issues that have furthered confounded
the usefulness of the ICPC.
The first issue relates to the confusion caused by the mandated
retention of "jurisdiction" by the "sending agency" and the inclusion
of birth parents within the scope of "sending agency." Even the most
ardent proponents of ICPC application to birth parents find that
applying the "sending agency" definition to a biological parent in the
Article V sense is not workable. Wendell and Rosenbaum, for
example, state that a biological parent who has relinquished a child
and consented to the adoption does not remain - as Article V would
mandate -- financially responsible for the child until the child's

adoption is finalized.67 This construction is certainly sensible, but it
also creates a situation in which Article V - despite its absolute
language -- applies some of the time but not always -- once again

raising confusion about the actual nature of the ICPC mandates.
The second issue is the ongoing conflict based on the questionable
applicability of the ICPC or the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act ("UCCJA"). This conflict focuses on jurisdiction in the legal
sense: a determination of which state's court has the authority to make
decisions related to children in interstate adoptive placements.
Proponents of the ICPC believe that the UCCJA applies only to
"custody disputes" and should not be applied in the case of interstate
adoptions. They argue that in those cases in which the ICPC and
UCCJA conflict, the ICPC must prevail because an interstate compact
is superior in status to any state statute with which it is inconsistent. 63
Many legal experts disagree. Joan Hollinger, for example, argues that
the UCCJA sets out the overriding jurisdictional rules and when

66.

See, e.g., In re Adoption of Zachariah K., 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 423, 431 (Cal.

Ct. App.1992) (holding that the ICPC's conferring of "jurisdiction' on sending
agencies is not tantamount to a grant of judicial authority and does not empower a
court to exercise jurisdiction).
67. See Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note 5, at 3A-10. This construction
provides additional support for the position that birth parents should not be included
within the scope of "sending agency."

68.

See id. at 3A-16.

The authors cite no judicial authority for this

proposition, and research has revealed none.
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conflicts occur, the UCCJA must prevail over the ICPC.6"
Illustrative of the problems are the multiple opinions issued by
Arizona courts as the case of J.D.S. v. Superior Court,7" later
entitled J.D.S. v. Franks,71 proceeded through appeal. In this case,
jurisdictional conflicts arose when a birth mother in Arizona placed
her child for adoption with a couple in Florida, despite the objections
of the birth father. The mother did not supply any information on the
birth father. She signed the relinquishment and on the day the ICPC
application was filed, turned her infant over to an attorney who was
facilitating the adoption. Later that day, the mother contacted the
attorney, stating that she had changed her mind and wanted the child
returned; the attorney refused. The following day, the Arizona ICPC
administrator approved the interstate placement and the child was
transferred to the adoptive couple who then returned to Florida and
filed the adoption petition. One week later, the birth mother notified
the birth father of the events, and he immediately filed for custody in
Arizona. In the course of this litigation, three differing opinions were
issued by the courts that considered the case.72
The trial court considered the question whether the state of
Arizona -- where the birth parents resided -- or the state of Florida --

where the child physically resided -- had jurisdiction over the case.
The trial court held that the ICPC, not the UCCJA, applied, and that
Florida had jurisdiction over the child.73
The birth father appealed and the Arizona Court of Appeals held
that the UCCJA was the appropriate law to resolve the jurisdictional
conflict. That court held that the ICPC does not apply to resolve
jurisdictional conflicts but instead speaks to whether an interstate
placement is appropriate. Applying the UCCJA, the court held that
Arizona had jurisdiction to decide the case. 74

69.
30 PAM.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Joan H. Hollinger, The UniformAdoptionAct:Reporter'sRuminations,
L.Q. 345, 369 (1996) [hereinafter The Uniform Adoption Act].
893 P.2d 749 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
893 P.2d 732 (Ariz. 1995).
Id. at 735-36.
J.D.S. v. Superior Court, 893 P.2d at 752.
Id. at 753.
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In the final and binding opinion issued in the case, the Supreme
Court of Arizona agreed with the court of appeals that the UCCJA was
the governing law, but upon applying the UCCJA, held that Florida,
not Arizona, had jurisdiction."
The three analyses reflect the confusion surrounding jurisdiction
over interstate adoption. Although it is clear that application of the
UCCJA can produce different results, it is also clear that the
introduction of the ICPC into the mix only further confounds matters.
The jurisdictional problems plaguing interstate placements are
further illustrated by the extremely troubling case of Marion County
Dep't. of Pub. Welfare v. Beard. 6 There, jurisdiction was disputed
in the context of significant issues regarding the child's best interests.
Two children were placed in foster care in Indiana and then, after the
mother completed the requirements in her service plan, the children
were returned to her by the Indiana public child welfare agency.
Shortly thereafter, one of the children died from a skull fracture, and
the mother pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. During the
mother's probation, the remaining child was placed with her aunt and
uncle in Tennessee. The mother, three years after this placement was
made, requested that the uncle be required to petition for guardianship
of the child and, in the event that he did not, that the child be returned
to Indiana. Despite the fact that the Indiana authorities were satisfied
with the child's placement in Tennessee for the preceding three years,
the agency, noting that the uncle had not applied for guardianship,
obtained an order from the Indiana county court ordering the child's
return to Indiana for determination of her best interests. In point of
fact, the uncle had petitioned for guardianship, and never received
notice of the Indiana county court's order. The Tennessee court in
which the uncle's petition was pending refused to return the child to
Indiana until it could decide the jurisdictional question. Subsequently,
the Tennessee court determined that it had jurisdiction and awarded
guardianship of the child to her uncle.77
Over the ensuing two years, Indiana and Tennessee battled over

75.
76.
77.

J.D.S. v. Franks, 893 P.2d at 743.
616 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 765-66.
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jurisdiction while the child remained in Tennessee. Ultimately, the
Indiana county court issued an order that the child be returned to
Indiana and, at the mother's request, ordered the public child welfare
agency to pay the legal expenses the mother had incurred in seeking
to have the child returned to her. The court agreed with the mother
that the Indiana child welfare agency, under the ICPC, had jurisdiction
and, therefore, financial responsibility. It rejected the public child
welfare agency's contention that under the UCCJA, Tennessee had
jurisdiction.78
The county court's orders were appealed and the Indiana Court
of Appeals considered the jurisdictional question. The court attempted
to resolve the dilemma by reading the UCCJA and the ICPC together
"to produce a harmonious system of legislation."79 The court's
analysis was as follows: under the ICPC, Indiana retained jurisdiction
as the sending agency and thus Tennessee lacked jurisdiction to order
the uncle's guardianship.' Furthermore, there was error in failing to
give notice to the uncle of the Indiana county court's order that the
child be returned to Indiana -- notice to which he was enttled under
Indiana law.81 Finally, the uncle in Tennessee was in the best
position to provide information relevant to the child's best interests -a concept recognized under the UCCJA as relevant to the
determination of which state has jurisdiction.8" Therefore, the order
requiring the child to be returned to Indiana required reversal.83
Quite aside from the unsettling practice issues,' this case, like

78.
79.

Id. at 766.
Id. at 768.

80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 769.

83. Id. at 770.
84. It is difficult to understand how this case evolved to the point at which the
appellate court became involved. Among the key practice issues is why neither
voluntary relinquishment nor termination of parental rights was pursued in relation
to the mother, particularly in light of the fact that her children had previously been
in foster care and were returned to her, and that she was responsible for the death
of one of her children. The mother was apparently given the power, some three
years after the child returned to foster care for the second time and after the death
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the Arizona cases, illustrates the complexity that is created
unnecessarily by attempts to incorporate ICPC directives into an
analysis of a true jurisdictional issue. While courts may reach
different outcomes vhen they apply the UCCJA, as illustrated in the
Arizona case, the UCCJA, nevertheless, is designed to address
specifically the jurisdictional issues inherent in interstate child custody
matters.' The ICPC clearly is not so designed, and, in reality, it
introduces extraneous considerations that only further confound
jurisdictional determinations.
Jurisdictional issues related to interstate adoptive placements
should be resolved solely by application of UCCJA principles. The
ICPC should be amended so that references to "jurisdiction" are
deleted, and language that relates to ongoing responsibility for children
prior to finalization of adoption is utilized. Article I(d) of the ICPC
should be modified to delete reference to "appropriate jurisdictional

of her sibling at her mother's hands, to place conditions on tie child's placement
with her uncle. The agency appeared willing to disrupt a three-year placement with
which it had been entirely satisfied. Allowing the mother to exercise such influene
in the process precipitated a two-year court battle, leaving the child in a state of
uncertainty and a stable placement in jeopardy.
85. The UCCJA does not expressly include adoptions within its definition of
"custody determination" or "custody proceeding" although many courts have ruled
that it does indeed apply to adoptions. Courts have recognized the importance of the
UCCJA's goal of having child custody proceedings heard in the forum with the
closest connections to and the most significant evidence about the prospective
adoptive family. The UCCJA preference for a "home state" basis for jurisdiction,
however, has been problematic in the context of many interstate adoptions and the
majority of infant adoptions because the child generally has not lived with the
adoptive parents from birth. As discussed by Hollinger, courts have often resorted
to rather convoluted analyses to fit adoptions within UCCJA categories. The
Uniform Adoption Act ("UAA"), recently proposed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, would change the UCCJA 'home state'
provision to include the state in which a child has lived with a birth parent or a
prospective adoptive parent for the requisite six or more consecutive months or, if
the child is an infant, the state in which the child has lived since shortly after birth.
For those adoptions that do not occur "soon after birth," the UAA permits adoptive
parents to file in the state where they have lived for six or more months even if the
child was recently placed with them. See Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act,
supra note 69, at 369-70.
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arrangements " 6 and to state, instead, that the Compact is designed
to clarify and enforce responsibility for the ongoing support of
children in care. Article V should be entitled "Responsibility for
Children in Interstate Placement" and Article V(a) should read:
The sending state shall retain responsibility for the child
and shall determine all matters in relation to the
supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child
which it would have had if the child had remained in the
sending state, until the child is adopted, becomes selfsupporting, or is discharged with the concurrence of the
appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such
responsibility, subject to the provisions of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, shall also include the
power to affect or cause the return of the child or the
child's transfer to another location. The sending state
shall continue to have financial responsibility for support
and maintenance of the child during the period of
placement. Nothing contained herein shall affect the
jurisdiction of the receiving state to deal with an act of
delinquency or crime committed therein.
D. Untimely and Unresponsive Implementation
of the Approval Process
Perhaps the most consistently troublesome aspect of the ICPC is
the untimely and unresponsive implementation of the approval process.
The difficulties in attaining the cooperative system contemplated by the
Compact are exacerbated by implementation of the ICPC on a state by
state basis. Even if the ICPC were appropriately construed to
encompass only public agency-directed adoptions of children in the
state's custody and were unambiguous in its application, the purpose
and policy of the Compact would be thwarted by the current realities
of its implementation.
Timeliness and responsiveness to the needs of children awaiting
adoption are not identified by the ICPC as core objectives of the
system which the Compact creates.
Nonetheless, courts have
criticized the bureaucratic mishandling that has impeded adoptive

86.

ICPC, supra note 4, art. I(d).
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placements,' and in some cases, expressed dismay at the ICPC's
failure to keep abreast of state law bearing on ICPC interstate
placement approvals.-" In other instances, the delays due to
cumbersome processes have led to frustrations and efforts to work
around the ICPC simply to achieve a needed adoptive placement for
a child in foster care. 9 The issue of serious and protracted delays
and administrative mismanagement in adhering to the procedural
mandates of the ICPC have become a key basis for questioning the
value of the ICPC as a regulatory tool.
The enormity of the implementation problems associated with the
ICPC is best illustrated by examples drawn from actual case files. '
The following cases illustrate some of the key problem areas,
including what is perhaps the most frequently cited obstacle, delay in
conducting and completing evaluations, as well as administrative
mismanagement, complexities associated with the public-private
agency relationship, and policies that fail to take into account
children's individualized needs.
1. Delay in Conducting and Completing
Evaluations
Case: In 1993, State A placed two sisters with their
grandmother in State B after obtaining State B's approval
for the foster care placement. In 1994, State A decided to
pursue adoption with the grandmother and requested that
87. See Hollinger, InterstateAdoptions, supra note 59, at 3A-1 1. See also In
re Adoption No. 10087, 597 A.2d 456 (Md. App. 1991).

88.

See, e.g., In re Adoption of Male Infant A., 578 N.Y.S.2d 9S8 (N.Y.

Faro. Ct. 1991).
89. See, e.g., In re Eli F., 260 Cal. Rptr 453 (1989). In this case, a social

worker submitted a report to the California court with jurisdiction over a child in
foster care, describing futile attempts to obtain information from the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children authorities in another state about the
suitability of placement in the aunt's home. She wrote, "[ulnfortunately, Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children is a cumbersome process and there has been
no communication as yet... regarding this matter." Id. at 458.

90.

The events in each case example are factual.

The names assigned to

children and families are solely for the purpose of enhancing the readability of the
cases.
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State B conduct an adoption home study. More than one
year later, State B still had not responded. State A sent
two letters, requesting information on the status of the
request, but received no response. Six months later, it
was discovered that State A had sent the incorrect request
forms. One month later, State A sent the correct forms
and finally, in November 1995, the home study was
initiated. In January 1996, State B decided that it could
not approve the home because there was no copy of the
divorce decree from the step-grandparent's first marriage.
Four months later, the step grandfather found a copy of
the divorce decree. On April 24, 1996 -- more than two

years after the request for adoption approval for a family
already approved for foster care -- State B approved the

home as an adoptive resource. The adoption was finalized
in September 1996.
2. Administrative Mismanagement
Case: State A requested approval of a placement of txvo
siblings with relatives in State B. State B approved the
placement, and Johnny was placed in November 1994 and
Jimmy in December 1995. State B agreed to supervise
these placements and provide State A with progress
reports. In March 1996, the children were freed for
adoption, and in April 1996, State A requested an
adoption home study of the relatives. Shortly thereafter,
State B [where the children were residing] wrote State A,
requesting information on the children's current status.
State A advised State B that State B should have the
relevant information: the children were in State B and
State B had been [allegedly] supervising the placement.
State A discovered at that point that State B had never
forwarded a progress report to State A on the children's
status. State B then assigned the home study required by
the ICPC, but as of October 1996, State B had provided
no information to State A.
3. Complexities in the Relationship Between
Public and PrivateAgencies
Case: In December 1994, State A identified a family in
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State B as a pre-adoptive family for Tommy. A licensed
private adoption agency in State B conducted a home
study and approved the adoptive placement. In May
1995, State A placed Tommy with the family and asked
State B to supervise the placement for six months. State
B refused because a private agency - and not the public
agency - had conducted the home study. State A
suggested that State B conduct its own home study and
then monitor the placement, offering to place Tommy
elsewhere during the home study process. State B
refused.
4. Policy Mandates that Override Individualized
Assessments of Children's Needs
Case: While in State A, Ms. Jones was a foster parent,
approved by State A, for Jimmy. Jimmy had entered
foster care in 1992, had four psychiatric hospitalizations,
and had a history of fire-setting and aggressive and selfabusive behaviors. Jimmy was legally freed for adoption
in March 1995 and State A decided to pursue the adoption
with Ms. Jones because she had shown a strong ability to
meet Jimmy's needs when she was his foster parent and
she was very interested in adopting him. Ms. Jones had
moved to State B and State A requested an adoption home
study by State B. State B conducted the home study and
refused to approve the placement because Ms. Jones was
a homosexual. State B had a regulation that prohibited
placements with homosexuals.

These case studies illustrate the extraordinary delays and other barriers
that the ICPC poses to interstate adoption. Efforts to address these
barriers, however, have been quite limited."
91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Mike Chapman, President ofthe Association
of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, and Sam
Ashdown, Chairperson of the Judicial Relations Committee to the Joint Committee
on ICPC Improvement on the Joint Committee's Recommendations to Improve the
Placement of ICPC Children (May 14, 1996) (on file with author). The Joint
Committee on ICPC Improvement is comprised of representatives from the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the National Assoiation of Public
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Serious reform of the ICPC requires, in addition to the
substantive changes already outlined, significant improvements in the
implementation of the ICPC approval process. First, thirty working
days from the date of the receiving state's receipt of the request to the
date of the approval or denial' should be a mandatory time line.
The time frame should apply to all children in the foster care system
for whom interstate placements are sought. Any attempt to create a
"special priority" category within the population of children in foster
care who are awaiting adoption should be rejected.93 Each child in
foster care awaiting an interstate placement has special priority by
virtue of the disruptions and trauma in his or her life and the
overwhelming need the child has for stability, security and safety.
While triaging of children in foster care may be appealing in light of
the current inefficiencies and undue complexities in the system, it
neither serves the best interests of children nor solves the inherent
problems of a heavily bureaucratic structure that is not performing in
a credible manner. By contrast, if the ICPC were reformed to
eliminate coverage of direct adoptive placements by parents and

licensed private agency-assisted adoptions, the system would be able
Child Welfare Administrators, and the Association of Administrators of ie Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children. The Committee's efforts have focused on
improving the delays in processing ICPC requests. The report of the Committee sets
forth certain recommendations that "may help reduce delays": improved interstate
communication, including the use of facsimile transmissions and judge to judge
communication when there has been undue delay; a national format for ICPC home
studies that could be "used for some cases"; new methods at the local level to handle
ICPC request processing; a national computer data network for state ICPC offices;

and continuation of the Joint Committee as a national forum on the ICPC. The
report does not recommend enforceable time frames for the approval process. It

outlines, instead, a special "priority placement" designation that could be developed
and implemented by sending courts. The recommendation is that procedures be
developed to allow sending courts to find, for some children, that a pla:ement must
be made on an expedited basis to meet the special needs of a child and note this
special designation in the court order.
92. See GUIDE TO THE INTERSTATE COMPACT, supra note 3, at 7 (suggesting
30 working days as "the maximum recommended processing time from the date the
receiving state compact office receives the notice of the proposed placement until the
placement is approved or denied").
93. See discussion supra note 91.
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to focus its resources on meeting a thirty working day standard of
efficiency for all children in foster care -- the children that the system
is designed to serve. Efficiency is far more likely to be achieved
under a mandated time frame that sets a standard of accountability for
all children than under a policy that attempts to determine which
children should be served in a relatively better way.
Second, the ICPC approval process should be critically examined
and redesigned so that the current technocratic process is replaced by
an individualized assessment based on children's best interests. The
case examples demonstrate the troubling degree to which adoptions
currently are denied or significantly delayed because of administrative
mismanagement, unreasonably complex documentation requirements,
and mechanistic application of regulatory mandates that fail to consider
the circumstances of the individual child. These factors have
significantly contributed to the delays consistently experienced in ICPC
implementation while in no way improving the information gathered
in the evaluation process, enhancing home studies, or expanding
services that respond to the needs of children and families. The goal
of enhanced efficiency must be combined with a goal of quality
individualized assessments that focus on those issues that are relevant
to determining whether a prospective adoptive family is appropriate
for a particular child.
Third, the administrative structure of the ICPC should be
examined in light of quality management principles. The strengths and
weaknesses of the current structure should be considered prior to
adding new procedures and processes and pressing other systems, such
as the judicial system, to take on additional responsibilities in relation
to interstate placements.94 A reconsideration of the structure and the
respective roles and responsibilities of the ICPC administrators, local
offices, and other system components may well reveal opportunities
to streamline the current processes in a way that achieves significant
efficiencies.

IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ICPC
In Article IV, the ICPC provides penalties for "illegal
94.

Id.
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placement." Article IV states that any violation of the Compact's
terms constitutes a violation of the laws of both the sending and
receiving states and "may be punished or subjected to penalty in either
jurisdiction in accordance with its laws."95 The only specific penalty
for a violation is "suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or
other legal authorization held by the sending agency." 96 As with
other substantive provisions of the ICPC, the focus is on child-placing
agencies and the emphasis is on the actions of the sending party, not
the receiving state.
The absence of any specific guidance in the ICPC regarding other
sanctions for violation of the ICPC has presented court3 with the
challenge of determining the impact of an ICPC violation on the
petition to adopt. Complicating their struggle in resolving this
question is uncertainty about the extent to which the "best interest of
the child" standard should be applied in deciding whether 1'o
grant or
deny the petition in the face of an ICPC violation. Courts have
developed various approaches and reached conflicting decisions on this
issue.
Courts have tended to proceed in one of three ways when a
violation of the ICPC has occurred: (1) they disregard the ICPC and
grant the petition to adopt without ICPC approval; (2) they deny the
petition to adopt because ICPC approval has not been obtained; or (3)
they require retroactive compliance with the ICPC. A few courts have
opted to grant adoption petitions without any ICPC approval
whatsoever.'
These courts seem to hold the view that ICPC
compliance makes no difference at all in the validity and
appropriateness of the adoption. On the other hand, at least two
courts98 have refused to finalize an adoption, at least partially because
of a violation of the ICPC. These cases seem to suggest a view that
ICPC compliance has a significant inherent value that transcends other
95. ICPC, supra note 4, art. IV.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., In the Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So.2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1985); In the Matter of Baby "E", 427 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1980).
98. See, e.g., Inre Adoption/Guardianslip No. 3598, 675 A.2d 170 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996), cert. granted, 678 A.2d 1047 (Md. 1996); In the Matter of the
Adoption of T.M.M., 608 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1980).
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considerations, including the best interests of the child.
Many courts have required retroactive compliance with the
ICPC,99 a trend that strongly suggests the view that a child's best

interests should be paramount and that those interests are served by
preserving the integrity of the adoptive family of which the child is a
part. It also suggests a view that ICPC prospective compliance, in
reality, makes relatively little difference in terms of the well being of
the adopted child. This position has been condemned by ICPC
proponents who have argued that "in order to improve compliance
with child protective laws and because of the superior legal force of
the compact, the sounder law is that ICPC requirements should be
strictly enforced. "100

Such a rule would elevate compliance with the technical, often
ambiguous provisions of the ICPC above all other considerations.
Such a result is well illustrated by In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
3598,101 in which the court set aside a finalized adoption based on

what the court characterized as the birth mother's and the adoptive
parents' "knowing violation" of the ICPC. "
In this case, the unmarried birth mother, a New York resident,
surrendered her child for adoption. She did not identify the birth
father on the ICPC application for interstate adoption approval. The
birth father had appeared at the hospital when the baby was born but
had been turned away by the mother's family. Two days after the
child's birth, he petitioned for an order declaring him to be the father
of the baby. He apparently was never given notice of the court
proceeding in which the mother formally surrendered the child. When
the infant was two weeks old, the adoptive parents took the child home

99. See, e.g., In re Adoption No. 10087, 597 A.2d 456 (Md. 1991) (using
best interests of child as standard for requiring retroactive compllance); In re
Adoption of Calynn, M.G., 523 N.Y.S.2d 729 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1987) (using best
interests of child standard to permit adoption petition to go forward and reducing
attorney's fees as sanction against attorney who persistently violated ICPC).
100. Wendell & Rosenbaum, supra note 5,at 3A-14.
101. 675 A.2d 170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). cert. granted, 678 A.2d 1047
(Md. 1996). As of the time of this writing, no decision had been issued.
102. Id. at 183.
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to Maryland.1 o3 They later testified that their attorney told them that
they had been given verbal approval by the ICPC to take the child
from Maryland to New York, but, in reality, neither the New York
nor the Maryland ICPC office had approved the application. One
month later, the adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption in which
they acknowledged that the birth father had not consented to the
adoption. The court awarded the family temporary custody. The birth
father, in the meantime, obtained an order declaring him to be the
father of the baby, and he filed an objection to the adoption
petition. 10- Some two years later, the case was tried and the
Maryland court issued a final decree of adoption. The birth father
appealed.'0 s
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals concluded that the
adoption must be set aside because the parties had knowingly violated
the ICPC -- the birth mother by deliberately failing to identify the
birth father and failing to provide him with notice of the adoption, and
the adoptive parents by wrongfully removing the child to Maryland,
knowing they did not have ICPC approval."0 6 Although the court
acknowledged that the child, now four years old, had bonded with the
adoptive family and would be traumatized by any separation, it found
that upholding the adoption would disempower the JCPC and

103. Id. at 173-74.
104. Id. at 175.
105. Id. at 176.
106. Id. at 183. This case presents significant issues related to unwed birth
father's rights, both on constitutional grounds as well as, possibly, on state statutory
grounds. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (unwed father may
not be denied by state law the right to consent to or to veto his child's adoption
where father has manifested a significant paternal interest in the child); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (state law presuming unfitness of unwed fathers as a
class found to violate Constitution on due process and equal protection grounds).
Some states allow men who are not married to the child's mother, but who have
formally established paternity, to veto the child's adoption. See, e.g., IND. CoDE,
§ 31-3-1-6.1 (1992). This analysis takes issue with the basis for the court's decision
-- the violation of the ICPC. It is not clear why the birth father in this case based
his legal arguments on the ICPC, rather than on what would appear to be stronger
constitutional or, perhaps, state statutory grounds -- either of which may have
mandated the ultimate outcome.
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encourage future violations."0 7 In response to the adoptive parents'
pleas to recognize the best interests of the child, the court stated that
the ICPC must be strictly enforced in order to protect the best interests
of children everywhere."' s
The cases that have considered the appropriate sanction for a
violation of the ICPC often involve a birth parent who is seeking to
revoke an adoption."0 9 Although some of the cases raise issues
related to the validity of consent and the rights of birth fathers, the
alleged violations often relate to adoptive parents' bringing a child into
the receiving state without the express approval of the ICPC offices in
both the sending and receiving states. These violations often take the
form of failures to comply with the technical requirements of the ICPC
or refusals to wait the extended periods of time required for obtaining
such approvals,110 neither of which results in any harm except
possibly presenting an affront to the ICPC itself. Interestingly,
enforcement issues have not surfaced in relation to children in publicly
supported foster care.
Enforcement of the ICPC should be re-conceptualized in a manner
that is consistent with the recommended changes to the scope of the
Compact and with the recommended changes in the substantive
provisions. Enforcement should be viewed in terms of the rights of
children who are being served by the interstate approval process, not
in terms of the narrow "illegal placement" concept that focuses on
technical and procedural compliance and the activities of the sending
party. The key issue related to enforcement should be whether, in a
timely way, the receiving state makes a determination of the

107. In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 675 A.2d at 183-84.
108. Id. at 187.

109. See, e.g., In re Adoption of C.L.W., 467 So.2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 675 A.2d 170 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996), cert. granted, 678 A.2d 1047 (Md. 1996): In the Matter of the Adoption of
TMM, 608 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1980); Stancil v. Brock, 425 S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1993).
110. See, e.g., Inre Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 675 A.2d 170 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1996), cert. granted, 678 A.2d 1047 (Md. 1996); Stancil v. Brock, 425
S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993); In the Matter of Baby "E", 427 N.Y.S.2d 705
(N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1980).
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qualifications and suitability of prospective adoptive parents, including
an assessment of the circumstances that bear on the child's safety and
well being. At the same time, the sending state should remain
responsible for providing the receiving state with accurate and timely
information about the child and the whereabouts of the family for
whom the evaluation is sought.'
Enforcement should take the form of financial incentives that
reward timely, quality assessments and financial penalties that result
when the mandatory time lines are not met, approvals are arbitrarily
withheld, or evaluations are inadequate to permit the sending state to
determine the appropriateness of the proposed placement. There may
be any number of possible ways to structure such a system. One
approach would be to develop a fee schedule whereby the sending
state pays a fee to the receiving state for the evaluation, with the full
fee paid for a quality, timely product and a reduction in fee if time
lines or minimal standards are not met. A second alternative would
be a charge-back system, in which the receiving state is charged for
the foster care payments made by the sending state during the
additional period of time occasioned by the receiving state's delay in
producing a timely and quality evaluation. Other approaches to
promoting an efficient and quality interstate adoption process and
enforcing standards of quality should be explored by practi;ioners and
policy makers alike. Such a process may well reveal creative
solutions to what has been a perennial problem in maximizing the
effectiveness of the ICPC.
At the same time, there must be a legal avenue of enforcement
that is available when, because of ICPC delay or mismanagement, the
stays of children in foster care are extended. One approach would be
to give standing to the child's foster parents and attorney and/or
guardian ad litem in the sending state and to the prospective adoptive
parent(s) in the receiving state to file an action against the public child
welfare agency in the receiving state when there is inaction or
11. Receiving states, for example, have experienced frustration when sending
states provide incorrect addresses for prospective adoptive families, making it
extremely difficult for staff in the receiving state to initiate the evaluation. Personal
communication with Anm Sullivan, Adoption Program Director, Child Welfare
League of America.
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administrative mismanagement. Relief might take the form of a
specific remedy (e.g., an order that the agency make the approval
determination immediately), damages (based on the emotional harm to
the child caused by the undue delay), and attorney's fees. Although
there may rarely be a need to resort to litigation, the knowledge that
there is legal recourse on behalf of waiting children would create an
additional incentive for timely and quality determinations.
V. INIPLEENTATION OF REFORM

As the range of proposed modifications to the ICPC is
considered, one of the critical issues is the method that should be
utilized to promote the implementation of the needed reforms. By
virtue of its current status as a compact, the ICPC can be modified
only with the consensus of all parties - the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. It is highly unlikely that this large
and diverse group of governmental entities will easily reach agreement
on substantive changes in the Compact, re-engineering of the ICPC
implementation process, and imposition of new measures to ensure
enforcement of the needed reforms. In particular, the enforcement
recommendations related to financial incentives and penalties and legal
recourse suggest that reform of the ICPC may be best accomplished
through a mechanism other than attempting to amend the Compact
itself.
Federal legislation that supplants the existing compact is a more
realistic alternative to reform of the interstate placement process.
Federal laws -- in the form of Titles IV-B and IV-E of the Social

Security Acte

and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and

Adoption Reform Act"3 -- already address critical aspects of child

welfare. The inclusion of interstate placements of children in publicly
supported foster care within the ambit of federal law would be
consistent with the existing nature and scope of federal oversight of
child welfare practice and policy. It is likely to be the only realistic
alternative to true interstate placement reform.

112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629(d), 670-679(a) (1994).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119(c) (1994 and Supp. 1996).
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CONCLUSION

A commentator recently wrote that "the ICPC and its
implementation ought to be reconsidered from the per;pective of
whether it facilitates, unnecessarily delays, or frustrate;s desirable
placements. 111 4 An analysis of the ICPC suggests that it more
frequently delays and frustrates desirable interstate placements of
children in the foster care system, including interstate adoptive
placements. The Compact plays a necessary and desirable regulatory
role, but its effectiveness and relevance have been sorely compromised
by the overly broad definition of its scope, problems in many of the
Compact's substantive provisions, and extreme implementation
difficulties. None of these problems is insurmountable. A newly
designed ICPC can play the role it was originally intended to serve:
promoting interstate cooperation with the ultimate goal of achieving
permanency for all children in foster care.

114. Hartfield, supra note 1, at 324-25.
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